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Third-party punishment, as an altruistic behavior, was found to relate to inequity aversion
in previous research. Previous researchers have found that altruistic tendencies, as
an individual difference, can affect resource division. Here, using the event-related
potential (ERP) technique and a third-party punishment of dictator game paradigm, we
explored third-party punishments in high and low altruists and recorded their EEG data.
Behavioral results showed high altruists (vs. low altruists) were more likely to punish the
dictators in unfair offers. ERP results revealed that patterns of medial frontal negativity
(MFN) were modulated by unfairness. For high altruists, high unfair offers (90:10) elicited
a larger MFN than medium unfair offers (70:30) and fair offers (50:50). By contrast, for
low altruists, fair offers elicited larger MFN while high unfair offers caused the minimal
MFN. It is suggested that the altruistic tendency effect influences fairness consideration
in the early stage of evaluation. Moreover, the results provide further neuroscience
evidence for inequity aversion.
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Introduction
Altruistic punishment refers to punishment imposed by individuals who punish free riders in the
group although it is costly and yields no material beneﬁts for the punishers. This punishment
may achieve and sustain social cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Altruistic punishment
includes second-party punishment and third-party punishment. Second-party punishment refers
to punishment inﬂicted by the person who suﬀered from the violation. For example, in
the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), the receiver can reject the unfair oﬀer from the
proposer; the rejection of the receiver is regarded as second-party punishment. Third-party
punishment refers to the circumstances in which a third party who did not directly suﬀer
from the violation is willing to pay a cost to punish the violator (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004a,b).
The third-party punishment of dictator game is an eﬀective tool to explore altruistic
punishment and fairness distribution (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). However, the costly
punishment violates the classic homo economicus theory that humans are always in pursuit
of proﬁt maximization. In the game, the dictator can decide how to distribute the money
while the receiver can only accept unconditionally. After observing the distribution and level
of cooperation, the otherwise disinterested third party can determine whether to pay a cost to
punish the individuals who violate the cooperation social norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
Compared with second-party punishment, third-party punishment could minimize violations of
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social norms and maintain social equality; examples of third-
party punishers are the justice system and police (Marlowe et al.,
2008).
Inequality aversion theory holds that third-party punishment
is the result of someone resisting inequality. More speciﬁcally,
individuals abandon self-interest voluntarily to pursue a more
equitable result. Several studies have found that participants
exhibit aversion against inequality and impose punitive measures
to reduce the pecuniary gap between people (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Dirk andMartin, 2006). Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) found
that punishment is imposed in order to make the violator’s
amount of money close to the average level.
Several lines of evidence support the viewpoint of inequity
aversion theory. First, Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) reciprocity
theory predicts that people tend to reward kind actions
and punish unkind actions. Their evidence suggests that the
evaluation of a kind action is based not only on its consequences
but also on its underlying intention.
Second, some researchers explain third-party punishment in
terms of cognition and emotion. When people internalize a
speciﬁc culture, morality that follows social norms will be formed.
Internal self-punishment will be elicited if the social norms are
violated (Masclet et al., 2003). Masclet et al. (2003) believes the
internal pressure is a kind of sense of guilt, which is the reason
why people want to punish violators even when they have not
experienced directly. When observing violations committed by
others, people can experience negative emotions such as the
desire for revenge, the urge to ﬁght or anger (Bosman and van
Winden, 1999; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000; Decker et al., 2003;
Abbink et al., 2004).
Neuroscience research provides further evidence for inequity-
aversion theory (Pérez and Kiss, 2012). In one functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Singer et al., 2006),
male volunteers who observed an unfair confederate receiving
pain showed lower empathy-related activation, accompanied by
reward-related activation that might represent the desire for
revenge. A positron emission tomography (PET) study (De
Quervain et al., 2004) investigating the neural mechanism of
third-party punishment in a trust game found that subjects
with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum, which has
been implicated in the processing of rewards, were willing
to incur greater costs in order to punish. Moreover, when
subjects, acting as third parties, determined to pay a cost to
punish the norm violators, ventral medial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) showed greater
activation than in costless punishment. It is thought that there
is a trade-oﬀ relation underling the monetary punishment
behavior. Speciﬁcally, participants need to weigh the emotional
satisfaction and monetary loss from the punishment at the
same time, which is indicated by vmPFC and mPFC, to
integrate the cognitive conﬂict with the decision-making
processing.
Actually, a number of people do not enact third-party
punishment. This is not inconsistent with inequity aversion
theory, which holds that attitudes on inequity distribution should
aﬀect third-party punishment. However, aside from the research
on the neural mechanisms of third-party punishment, only a
few studies have explored individual diﬀerences in this behavior.
Haruno and Frith (2009) explored how social value orientation,
as an individual diﬀerence, aﬀects anchoring attitudes toward
resource division. Results revealed that the prosocials disliked
large absolute diﬀerences in distributions (inequity aversion),
whereas the individualists were unaﬀected by such diﬀerences.
Moreover, the extent of inequity aversion in prosocials was
predicted by activity in the amygdala and appeared to be
impervious to cognitive load.
In the current study, altruistic tendency was introduced as
an individual diﬀerence predicting altruistic punishment. In
addition to behavioral results from the punishment of dictator
game, event-related potential (ERP) technique was employed to
assess the neural process of fairness consideration in altruistic
punishments.
Medial frontal negativity (MFN) was referred to a family
of negative-going ERPs peaking between 200 and 350 ms
at frontocentral recording sites. MFN is associated with
performance evaluation, including error-related negativity (ERN;
Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1990) and feedback-related
negativity (FRN; Miltner et al., 1997). Some studies have found
that MFN is sensitive to the violation of social expectancy or
social norms (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Van der Veen and
Sahibdin, 2011; Wu et al., 2011, 2012; Qu et al., 2013b). In an
ultimatum game study, Wu et al. (2011) reported that compared
with moderately unequal oﬀers, highly unequal oﬀers generated
larger MFN indicating that the MFN can reﬂect a general
violation of social expectancy. In present study, we predict that
high altruists and low altruists would show diﬀerent patterns in
MFN because of diﬀerent social expectancy.
We also examined another ERP component, P300, as an ERP
component that has attracted interest in emotion and attention
research. As shown in previous studies, P300 is sensitive to
the valence and the magnitude; positive feedback generated
larger P300 negative feedback (Wu and Zhou, 2009; Leng and
Zhou, 2010; Qu et al., 2014). Yeung and Sanfey (2004) posited
that the P300 is modulated by the individual’s attention and
emotional experience in result evaluations. Researchers have also
found that P300 is signiﬁcantly larger in reward conditions than
in punishment or non-reward conditions (Hajcak et al., 2005;
Bellebaum and Daum, 2008).
Therefore, the present research, employing the ERP technique,
tested whether and how altruistic tendency aﬀects third-party
punishment. For behavioral results, we hypothesized that unfair
oﬀers would elicit more third-party punishments according
to inequity aversion theory, and altruistic tendencies would
moderate third-party punishments. Compared with low altruists,
high altruists would show more third-party punishment when
observing the unfair oﬀer. As for the ERP results, MFN outcomes
with larger violation of expectancy should elicit larger MFN than
outcomes in line with expectancy. For high altruists, an expected
outcome is the fair oﬀer, while the unfair oﬀer is an unexpected
result. The opposite pattern should be found for low altruists.
Therefore, we expected that when the high altruists observed
the unfair oﬀer, greater MFN would be elicited, whereas the low
altruists would show greater MFNwhen a fair oﬀer was observed.
Considering the P300 is associated with the emotional arousal, we
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assume that the unfair oﬀer would elicit larger P300 than the fair
oﬀer. High and low altruists will show variation in the pattern of
P300, and show diﬀerent punishment behavior.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy right-handed undergraduate students from the South
China Normal University voluntarily participated in the ﬁrst
stage of the research, and then a distribution task was used
as a pretest through which thirty-two participants (22 females
and 10 males,18–24 years of age) were selected to take part in
the formal experiment. The mean age of the participants was
21.4 years. Participants reported no physical or mental illness and
reported normal eyesight. Informed consent was obtained from
all participants, and the research was approved by the Human
Research Ethics Committee of South China Normal University.
Material
The third-party punishment dictator game was presented using
the E-Prime experimental program. We applied color bars to
present the allocations of the dictator. The horizontal viewing
angle of each target picture was 3◦ and the vertical viewing angle
was 1.5◦.
Design and Procedure
The design was a two factor mixed design with the ﬁrst factor
referring to the level of fairness (Fair oﬀer, Medium Unfair
oﬀer, High Unfair oﬀer) and the second factor referring to
the altruistic tendency (High, Low). Recent studies have shown
that the dictator game is an eﬀective paradigm to diﬀerentiate
altruistic behavior (Benenson et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2008;
Rotemberg, 2008). Thus we used the dictator game to identify
participants with high and low altruistic tendencies. Participants
were presented with a pair of rewards (totally 100 Yuan) for
self and the other, 35 times. Three predetermined allocations
including a low altruistic tendency allocation (90:10), medium
altruistic tendency allocation (70:30), and high altruistic tendency
allocation (50:50) were presented. We assigned participants to
a certain category (high altruist, low altruist) if they made
consistent decisions more than 75% of the time. Finally, 32
participants were selected for the formal experiment, 16 (3
male, 13 female) high altruists and 16 (7 males, 9 females) low
altruists.
Our experiment adopted a modiﬁed paradigm of the third-
party punishment of dictator game (Qu et al., 2014). In the
formal task, participants were assigned a role of third party and
received an initial endowment of 50 Yuan. They ﬁrst witnessed
a distribution of 100 Yuan between two players (the dictator
and the receiver). Subsequently, the participants would have an
opportunity to adjust the distribution by subtracting 15 Yuan
from their endowment to turn the unfair oﬀer into a fair oﬀer
in order to punish the dictator. The fairness factor includes three
levels: Fair oﬀer refers to both dictator and receiver owning 50
Yuan, Medium Unfair oﬀer refers to 70 Yuan for the dictator
and 30 Yuan for the receiver, and High Unfair oﬀer refers to
90 Yuan for the dictator and 10 Yuan for the receiver. In other
words, if the distribution is 90:10, the participant can spend 15
Yuan to punish the dictator, thus the distribution result will
become 50:50. Before starting the dictator game, the participants
were informed that the dictator results come from another group
of over 300 participants who had participated previously. All
participants were paid 20 Yuan as a basic payment, and were
informed that an extra reward would be paid according to their
decisions in the task. We randomly chose one trial’s balance
as his extra reward. After the experiment, we asked all the
participants whether they believe that they were playing against
the real human players, most of the participants considered
they encountered the real person in the game. Participants were
debriefed, paid, and thanked.
Participants were seated comfortably in an audio-shielded
room with a fabric cap and were required to gaze at the screen
center, which was 1 m away in front of their eyes. Participants
were asked to read detailed task instructions. All participants
had 20 trials to practice until they fully understood the task. The
formal experiment process is shown in Figure 1. In each round
of the game, every participant was required to gaze at a ﬁxation
point that appeared as “+” in the center of the screen for 800–
1000 ms. Then the initial allocation scheme of the dictator was
shown on the screen. A color bar was presented for 1500 ms,
with a portion in red on the left side representing the score of the
dictator, and a portion in blue on the right side representing the
score of the recipient. Next, a selection window was given, and
the participant was prompted to press the “F” or “J” key on the
keyboard within 2 s to indicate whether to change the allocation
of the dictator. After the decision-making, the subject would see
a ﬁxation point “+” for 800–1000 ms and then observe the ﬁnal
distribution and his/her score in this round. This was one trial of
the task. If the participant was willing to turn the unfair oﬀer into
a fair oﬀer, he/she would be deducted 15 Yuan; if not, the ﬁnal
oﬀer would be consistent with the initial allocation, and thus the
third party (participant) would retain 50 Yuan. The three fairness
levels were presented in random order and each condition had
50 trials, thus there were 150 trials in the experiment. From the
beginning of the formal task, EEG data and the frequency of
punishment by each participant were recorded.
Record of ERP
EEGs were recorded from 32 scalp sites at 500 Hz rate. All
electrodes were embedded in an elastic cap. The EEG signals
were ampliﬁed with a band pass of 0.01–100 Hz by online
ﬁltering of BrainAmps (Brain Products, Munich). All electrode
recordings were referenced online to the right mastoid and
oﬀ-line re-referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids.
The horizontal electrooculograms (HEOGs) were monitored
with oﬀ-line electrodes located in both laterals of the eyes,
the vertical electrooculograms (VEOGs) were placed above and
below the left eye. Brain Vision Analyzer (analysis software)
was performed to exclude the eye-movement signal by using
independent component analysis for continuous data. Trials
with EEG artifacts that exceeded ±80 µV from the mean
amplitude during the recording epoch were eliminated. EEG data
were measured and analyzed by no-phase-shift low-pass digital
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a single trial of the third-party punishment event-related potential (ERP) study. ERP time locked to initial allocation
scheme.
ﬁltering of 20 Hz. EEG epochs of 1000 ms, within a 200 ms pre-
stimulus baseline, would be superimposed to analyze after the
initial allocation scheme.
Based on the procedure used in previous research (Gering
and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005), MFN is maximal on
the frontocentral electrodes, thus data from electrode sites Fz,
FCz, Cz were pooled for analysis. For P300 analysis, the largest
amplitude appears in the posterior sites, so a pooling of Cz, Pz
electrodes was used for analysis. The mean amplitude of MFN is
between 290 and 390 ms, while the mean amplitude of P300 is
between 400 and 600 ms.
Results
Behavioral Results
The frequency of the third-party punishment by level of high and
low altruistic tendency was presented in Table 1. Considering
the possible gender diﬀerence, we regard the gender factor
as a covariate. A 3 (fairness: Fair, Medium Unfair, High
Unfair) × 2 (altruistic tendency: High, Low) repeated measures
analysis of variance (rm-ANOVA) was applied to analyze the
frequency of third-party punishment. Altruistic tendency was
the between-subjects variable, fairness was the within-subjects
variable, gender was covariate. The results show signiﬁcant main
eﬀects of the fairness [F(2,58) = 22.542, p < 0.001] and altruistic
tendency [F(1,29) = 12.505, p = 0.001]. The interaction between
fairness and altruistic tendency was signiﬁcant, [F(2,58) = 5.352,
p= 0.006]. Furthermore, the simple eﬀect analysis suggested that
for low altruists, the medium and high unfair oﬀers generated
more punitive behaviors than fair oﬀers (both p < 0.001),
the diﬀerence of the punishments between fair and medium
unfair oﬀers was signiﬁcant, p = 0.002. For high altruists,
they signiﬁcantly showed less punishments in fair and medium
unfair oﬀers than in high unfair oﬀers (both p < 0.001), but
the diﬀerence between fair and medium unfair oﬀers was not
signiﬁcant.
ERP Results
Two female participants were excluded because of displaying
excessive artifacts in EEG recording. The remaining 30
participants included 15 high altruists (3 male and 12 female)
and 15 low altruists (7 male and 8 female). Table 2 presents the
means and SD of MFN and P300 amplitudes in three diﬀerent
distribution schemes. Figure 2 shows the average waveforms to
diﬀerent allocations for high and low altruists.
TABLE 1 | Frequency of third-party punishment by level of altruistic
tendency.
Allocation scheme High altruists Low altruists
50: 50 0 0
70: 30 14.19 ± 20.50 5.12 ± 5.30
90: 10 44.88 ± 6.75 27.81 ± 10.76
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TABLE 2 | Average amplitude and SD of medial frontal negativity (MFN) and P300 in different distribution schemes, by level of altruistic tendency.
Electrode Fair (50: 50) Medium unfair (70: 30) High unfair (90: 10)
High altruists Low altruists High altruists Low altruists High altruists Low altruists
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
MFN
Fz −1.15 4.79 0.93 4.14 −2.03 4.37 0.17 3.11 −3.31 3.67 3.65 4.07
FCz −0.27 3.65 0.76 3.91 −1.25 4.18 0.27 2.89 −3.15 3.44 2.93 3.77
Cz 1.57 4.04 1.69 4.20 0.48 3.99 1.45 3.13 −1.12 2.91 3.91 3.95
P300
Cz 3.32 4.84 1.08 4.41 4.23 2.96 1.38 3.26 4.43 3.55 5.46 5.02
Pz 4.02 3.99 2.18 3.48 5.62 3.66 2.64 3.31 6.26 4.19 7.24 4.43
For the MFN amplitude, gender as a covariate, a 2
(altruistic tendency: High, Low) × 3 (fairness: Fair, Medium
Unfair, High Unfair) × 3 (electrode location: Fz, FCz, Cz)
rm-ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of altruistic
tendency, F(1,27) = 5.63, p = 0.03: amplitude of high altruists
(−1.13 ± 0.9 µV) was markedly greater than low altruists
(1.75 ± 0.86 µV). The interaction between altruism level
and fairness was signiﬁcant, F(2,54) = 14.53, p < 0.001.
More speciﬁcally, amplitudes seen in high altruists and low
altruists varied in diﬀerent ways across the three allocations.
For high altruists, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence across allocations
[F(2,27) = 6.68, p = 0.004] showed that MFN amplitude of
high unfair oﬀers (−2.52 ± 0.89 µV) was more negative-
going than fair oﬀers (0.031 ± 1.03 µV) and medium
unfair oﬀers (−0.94 ± 0.9 µV), (p = 0.004, p = 0.05),
whereas the medium unfair oﬀers (−0.94 ± 0.9µV) did
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with fair oﬀers (0.031 ± 1.03 µV),
(p = 0.60). Low altruists also showed signiﬁcant variance
in fairness consideration, F(2,27) = 10.31, p < 0.001: MFN
in fair oﬀers (1.15 ± 1.03 µV) and medium unfair oﬀers
(0.60 ± 0.91 µV) was more negative-going than in high
unfair oﬀers (3.49 ± 0.90 µV), (p = 0.008, p = 0.001);
but no diﬀerence was found between medium unfair and fair
oﬀers, p = 0.90 (Figure 3A). A non-signiﬁcant main eﬀect
reﬂected no diﬀerence across fairness levels, F(2,54) = 1.69,
p = 0.20. The main eﬀect of electrode location was not
signiﬁcant, F(2,54) = 0.90, p = 0.37. In addition, there were no
interactions between electrode location and altruistic tendency,
F(2,54) = 3.74, p = 0.06 or fairness and electrode location,
F(4,108) = 0.32, p = 0.80. Likewise, no signiﬁcant interaction
was found between electrode location, fairness and altruistic
tendency, F(4,108) = 0.38, p = 0.76.
For the amplitude of P300, we also considered gender as a
covariate, a 2 (altruistic tendency: High, Low) × 3 (fairness:
Fair, Medium Unfair, High Unfair) × 2 (electrode location: Pz,
Cz) ANOVA yielded a signiﬁcant interaction between altruistic
tendency and fairness level, F(2,54) = 5.48, p = 0.008. Simple
eﬀect analysis found that P300 showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
of fairness levels for low altruists, F(2,27) = 117.17, p < 0.001
but not for high altruists, F(2,27) = 1.50, p = 0.24. For low
altruists, P300 amplitude for high unfair oﬀers (6.33 ± 1.06 µV)
was more positive than fair oﬀers (1.60 ± 1.05 µV) and
medium unfair oﬀers (1.97 ± 0.80 µV), (both p < 0.001), but
diﬀerence between fair oﬀers (1.60 ± 1.05 µV) and medium
unfair oﬀers (1.97 ± 0.80 µV) was not signiﬁcant, p = 0.66
(Figure 3B). No main eﬀect of altruistic tendency was found,
F(1,27)= 1.35, p= 0.26. The main eﬀect of fairness did not reach
signiﬁcant, F(2,54) = 2.71, p = 0.08. No signiﬁcant interaction
was found between altruistic tendency and electrode location
[F(1,27) = 0.008, p = 0.93] or between electrode location and
fairness [F(2,54) = 0.52, p = 0.59]. The interaction among
electrode location, fairness level and altruistic tendency was also
not signiﬁcant, F(2,54) = 0.14, p = 0.86.
To isolate variance in the ERP associated with the MFN
and P300 from other overlapping ERP components, we created
diﬀerence waves by subtracting each low altruist ERP from
its appropriate corresponding high altruist ERP (Hajcak et al.,
2005; Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007). Speciﬁcally, for each
participant and channel, we created three diﬀerence waves by
(1) subtracting the fairness ERP in the low altruist condition
from the high altruist condition, creating a “fairness” diﬀerence
wave; (2) subtracting the medium unfairness ERP in the low
altruist condition from the high altruist condition, creating a
“medium unfairness” diﬀerence wave; (3) subtracting the high
unfairness ERP in the low altruist condition from the high
altruist condition, creating a “high unfairness” diﬀerence wave.
The amplitude of each diﬀerence wave was measured for each
participant and electrode as the most negative deﬂection and
the most positive deﬂection within the 0–800 ms following
stimulus onset. Consistent with previous studies (Gering
and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005), MFN amplitude
was evaluated at channel Fz, FCz, Cz, and P300 amplitude
was evaluated at channel Cz, Pz, where they are normally
maximal.
Following previous research, we adopted the algorithm of
Holroyd and Krigolson (2007) to measure if MFN was aﬀected
by late positive component (especially P300). We carried out two
sets of t-tests to compare results in the FCz and Pz locations, ﬁrst
for high altruists and second for low altruists. Results revealed
that high altruistic tendency participants showed signiﬁcantly
larger amplitude at FCz than at Pz in all fairness conditions.
For fair oﬀers, the amplitude at FCz (−0.27 ± 3.65 µV) was
signiﬁcantly greater than at Pz (4.55 ± 3.00 µV), t(14) = −6.14,
p < 0.001, and in medium unfair oﬀers, amplitude in FCz
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FIGURE 2 | Continued
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FIGURE 2 | Continued
Event-related potential data associated with high and low
altruists. (A) Grand-average ERP waveforms to different allocations for
high altruists and low altruists. The shaded 290–390 ms and
400–600 ms time windows were used to measure the medial frontal
negativity (MFN) and P300 magnitude, respectively. (B) The scalp
distribution of the MFN and P300 difference waves on different levels
of unfairness of the high altruists. (C) The scalp distribution of the
MFN and P300 difference waves on different levels of unfairness of the
low altruists.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean amplitude of MFN and P300 for high and low altruists at different fairness levels. (A) MFN amplitude recorded in Fz channels. (B) P300
amplitude recorded in Pz channels.∗Significant difference refers to a p < 0.05. Error bars represent SE.
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(−1.25 ± 4.18 µV) was also signiﬁcantly greater than in
Pz (3.21 ± 3.45 µV), t(14) = −4.06, p < 0.01. Moreover,
in high unfair oﬀers, amplitude in FCz (−3.15 ± 3.44 µV)
was signiﬁcantly more positive than in Pz (1.59 ± 4.81 µV),
t(14) = −3.32, p < 0.01. t-tests in the subgroup of low altruistic
tendency participants showed that FCz (0.76 ± 3.91 µV) was
greater than Pz for fair oﬀers (2.61 ± 3.40 µV),t(14) = −2.17,
p < 0.05. The same pattern emerged for medium unfair oﬀers,
(0.27± 0.75µV; 2.55± 3.12µV, t(14)= −2.64, p< 0.05), but the
t-test result for high unfair oﬀers found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between FCz (2.93 ± 3.77 µV) and Pz (3.84 ± 3.28 µV),
t(14) = −1.09, p = 0.296. All of these results indicated that the
MFN components were mainly distributed in the front of the
scalp, not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by P300.
Additional evidence of the relationship between P300 and
behavioral performance was obtained by testing the correlations
between P300 responding to fairness levels in either high or
low altruists and their behavioral performance in each group
(as there is no punitive behavior confronting fair oﬀers in
either group, here we only consider medium unfair and high
unfair conditions for both groups). For high altruists, behavioral
performances under both medium unfair situation and high
unfair situation were correlated signiﬁcantly with corresponding
P300s [r(15) = 0.57, p < 0.01; r(15) = 0.84, p < 0.001]. And the
consistent behavioral patterns remained signiﬁcant even when
gender was controlled [r(12) = 0.86, p < 0.001; r(12) = 0.55,
p < 0.05]. For low altruists, their behavioral performance under
medium unfair and high unfair oﬀers correlated signiﬁcantly
with corresponding P300 [r(15) = 0.61, p < 0.05; r(15) = 0.52,
p < 0.05]. Also, this relationship remained signiﬁcant when
gender was controlled [r(12) = 0.61, p < 0.05; r(12) = 0.59,
p < 0.05]. In other words, participants’ behavioral performance
was predicted by the P300 under corresponding condition,
and the relationship was not diminished when the relationship
between gender and these two variables were taken into account.
Discussion
This study tested whether altruistic tendency aﬀects altruistic
punishment and examined the neural process of fairness
consideration. Consistent with prior research, third parties were
more likely to punish unfair oﬀers than fair oﬀers, even at
expense to themselves. However, altruistic tendency appeared to
inﬂuence third-party punishment, in that high altruists imposed
more of this type of punishment than low altruists. ERP results
also indicated that altruistic tendency modulated the fairness
consideration of the outcome. For high altruists, high unfair
oﬀers elicited larger MFN than medium unfair oﬀers and fair
oﬀers; for low altruists, in contrast, fair oﬀers elicited larger MFN,
and high unfair oﬀers caused the minimal MFN, which suggest
that the altruistic tendency eﬀect inﬂuence fairness consideration
in the early stage of evaluation.
The behavioral results replicated third-party punishments and
extend previous research ﬁnding altruistic tendency inﬂuences
the punishments. In the experiment, all participants were paid
50 Yuan as initial endowment, and they were informed that
they can spend 15 Yuan to alter the unfair allocation to the fair
one; the cost could not be compensated within expectation, after
the pay cost, the third party (participant) would own the least
payment in three. However, most participants chose irrational
altruistic punishment, thus support the inequity aversion theory.
The present research extends our understanding of altruistic
behaviors by focusing on individual diﬀerences in third-party
punishment. Third-party punishment, as a kind of irrational
behavior in economic decision making, is not shown by all
people. Economic societies are constituted by members with
a variety of altruistic tendencies. Therefore, further research
is necessary to consider these individual diﬀerences. It will be
particularly important to explore the psychological and neural
mechanism of fairness consideration toward population who
show less altruistic punishments.
Use of the ERP technique enabled us to explore how altruistic
tendency aﬀects fairness consideration. Speciﬁcally, for high
altruists, unfair oﬀers elicited a larger MFN and for low altruists,
fair oﬀers elicited larger MFN. According to the expectancy
deviation theory of MFN, unexpected outcomes cause a larger
MFN (Oliveira et al., 2007); in our study, the same allocation
elicited diﬀerentMFN reaction patterns, which suggests that high
and low altruists hold diﬀerential expectations about allocation.
Hence, MFN was enhanced when high altruists saw the unfair
allocation because it conﬂicted with their expectations, and it
was enhanced when low altruists saw the fair allocation, which
conﬂicted with their expectations.
The ERP results shed light on the relationship between the
altruistic tendency and third-party punishment, in addition to
providing further electrophysiological evidence in support of
the inequity aversion hypothesis. Previous studies who studied
the decision-making process in the dictator game showed that
decisions are the result of a two-step process. In the ﬁrst step,
decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. The
second step is a more deliberative phase in which decision
makers adjust their proposals based on motivation and cognitive
resources, a process that is modulated by social context, such
as the perceived interpersonal closeness of the dictator with the
receiver (Cappelletti et al., 2011; Grimm and Mengel, 2011; Rand
et al., 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2013). In line with the social
intuitionist model, the current ERP results suggest that the eﬀect
of altruistic tendency on altruistic punishment occurs in the
early stage of the outcome evaluation, which provides further
cognitive neuroscience evidence for the intuition dominant two-
step processing theory. An important ﬁnding in this regard is
that high and low altruists appeared to diﬀer in inequity aversion.
More speciﬁcally, for high altruists, the aversion to unfairness
elicited greater MFN and led to paid altruistic punishment in
more than 95% of the tasks; for low altruists, their concern was
more about pursuit of their maximal self-interests. From the
perspective of the low altruists, the dictator should pursue the
maximization of self-interest, and high unfair allocation may be
an expectable result. Because unfair oﬀers do not trigger strong
aversion, unfair outcomes elicited a smaller MFN and caused less
punishment.
The ERP results also showed that high altruists had more
negative-going MFN in response to high unfair oﬀers, whereas
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there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between medium unfair
oﬀers and fair oﬀers. By contrast, for low altruists, MFN was
signiﬁcantly larger for fair oﬀers compared with low and high
unfair oﬀers. This shows that MFN in all allocations for high
and low altruists was binary, not ternary. MFN relates to a
rough primary processing for allocations, which only evaluates
whether the outcome was good or not (Hajcak et al., 2006;
Leng and Zhou, 2010). Although many studies have found that
MFN may represent more complicated information regarding
outcomes, likely to be ternary or even polynary, the presentation
of outcome materials in previous research was apparent and
no subsequent task was introduced after the outcome appeared
(Leng and Zhou, 2010; Luo et al., 2011; Qu et al., 2013a).
In our experiment, after the distribution outcome was given,
participants were required to decide whether to pay to punish the
dictator, so participants could only make a simple dichotomous
choice. For the behavioral results, we observed that the low
altruists showed less frequency of the third-party punishment
behaviors toward high unfair oﬀers. For MFN, the high altruists
showed larger MFN related to high unfair oﬀers than moderate
unfair oﬀers and fair oﬀers, but the low altruists showed the
opposite patterns. We infer that because MFN occurs in the early
stage of the outcome evaluation, it just reﬂects the awareness
of fairness rather than aﬀect the punishment behaviors of the
participants. Therefore, behavioral results were inconsistent with
the MFN results.
For high altruists, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in P300
depending on the fairness of the allocation; for low altruists,
high unfair allocation induced more positive P300. Both for
high altruists and for low altruists, behavioral performances
under both medium unfair situation and high unfair situation
were correlated signiﬁcantly with corresponding amplitude of
P300. More speciﬁcally, P300 might be related to altruist’s
punishments, larger amplitude of P300 predicts more third-party
punishments.
This study only explored the inﬂuence of altruistic tendency
on fairness consideration, and did not explore how altruistic
tendency impacts the participants’ willingness to pay to punish
after becoming aware of the unfairness. In the end of the
experiment, many participants reported that they had been aware
of the unfairness in the tasks. However, they were not willing
to pay such a high price to change the unfair allocation. Thus,
further research will examine the trade-oﬀ processing in deciding
the costly punishment.
Conclusion
This study is the ﬁrst to examine the inﬂuence of altruistic
tendency on third-party punishment and the neurophysiological
process underlying fairness consideration. Behavioral results
showed that compared with low altruists, high altruists delved
out more third-party punishment; ERP results indicated that
altruistic tendency also aﬀected the awareness of fairness in
the early stage of evaluation: for high altruists, high unfair
allocation elicited more negative-going MFN amplitude, but
for low altruists, fair oﬀer triggered greater MFN. Speciﬁcally,
these results demonstrate a stronger inequity aversion in high
altruists than in low altruists, which may cause more punishment
behavior.
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